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Research Paper No. 1/08 
 
DOES THE BALANCED SCORECARD WORK: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Abstract 
 
Commentators suggest that between 30 and 60% of large US firms have adopted the 
Balanced Scorecard, first described by Bob Kaplan and David Norton in their seminal 
Harvard Business Review paper of 1992 (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Marr et al, 2004).  
Empirical evidence that explores the performance impact of the balanced scorecard, 
however, is extremely rare and much that is available is anecdotal at best.  This paper 
reports a study that set out to explore the performance impact of the balanced scorecard by 
employing a quasi-experimental design.  Up to three years worth of financial data were 
collected from two sister divisions of an electrical wholesale chain based in the UK, one of 
which had implemented the balanced scorecard and one of which had not.  The relative 
performance improvements of geographically matched pairs of branches were compared to 
establish what, if any, performance differentials existed between the branches that had 
implemented the balanced scorecard and those that had not.  The key findings of the study 
are that while the Electrical division – the division that implemented the balanced 
scorecard – sees improvements in sales and gross profit; similar performance 
improvements are also observed in the sister division.  Hence the performance impact of 
the balanced scorecard has to be questioned.  Clearly further work on this important topic 
is required in similar settings where natural experiments occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: performance measurements, performance management, performance impact, 
balanced scorecard. 
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1. Background and Context 
Commentators suggest that between 30 and 60% of large US firms have adopted the 
Balanced Scorecard, first described by Bob Kaplan and David Norton in their seminal 
paper of 1992 (Frigo and Krumwiede, 1999; Frigo, 2000).  Despite this impressive take up, 
however, there is a paucity of empirical evidence that explores the performance impact of 
the balanced scorecard and indeed of performance measurement systems more generally 
(Franco-Santos et al. 2007; Melnyk et al.  2004).  In fact the extant literature has tended to 
focus on the problems with traditional measurement systems and how these can be 
overcome with alternative measurement methods and frameworks, such as the Balanced 
Scorecard and the Performance Prism (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Neely et al., 2002).  As a 
result much work has been carried out on the design and deployment of measurement 
systems, but relatively little on their impact (Bourne et al., 2000; Neely et al., 2000). 
The aim of this paper is to explore the performance impact of balanced scorecards.  The 
paper draws on data gathered over three-year period from a major wholesaler of electrical 
components in the UK, referred to as Electrical.  The board of Electrical decided to 
implement a balanced scorecard in late 1999 and began working on the design of their 
balanced scorecard in early 2000.  They spent six months completing the design phase of 
the process and a further six months rolling the balanced scorecard out across their UK 
branch network.  On 1st January 2001 the balanced scorecard was formally launched and 
from that day the business stopped releasing information on branch profitability, which 
previously had been the main method of branch measurement.  They also changed the 
firm’s incentive scheme, moving away from a bonus based on branch profitability and to a 
bonus based on performance against the balanced scorecard. 
Importantly, mid-way during the rollout phase of the project (in the 3rd quarter of 2000), 
Electrical was acquired by another UK wholesaler of electrical components.  The acquiring 
company – referred to in the paper as Sister – continued to use traditional methods of 
performance reporting at the branch level, namely profit and loss accounts, throughout 
2001.  This situation presented the researchers with a valuable opportunity – effectively a 
naturally occurring experiment.  In essence the research team was able to construct a 
sample of 56 pairs of matched branches (based on location), drawn from the samples 
provided by Electrical and Sister.  One branch in each matched sample had adopted the 
balanced scorecard while the other had not.  This matched sampling technique, known as 
quasi-experimental design, is a powerful methodology for assessing the impact of 
organizational changes (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  In this study, the matched sample 
provided two particularly valuable controls.  First, because both divisions essential sold the 
same products to the same range of customers, many sectoral differences are accounted 
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for.  Second, the geographic matching controls for local economic activity – both in terms 
of demand and in terms labour availability – two key determinants of branch performance. 
The rest of the paper consists of five main sections.  In the first the relevant literature is 
explored, as this sets the scene for the study.  In the second the methodology used in this 
study is explained and justified.  The third section presents a summary of the balanced 
scorecard design and deployment process used by the firm.  This is important as one of the 
potential criticisms of this research – namely that the balanced scorecard was poorly 
designed and deployed in negated when one considers how carefully the organisations 
approached the design and deployment of their balanced scorecard.  The fourth section 
presents the quantitative analysis of the impact of the balanced scorecard, using branch 
level performance data.  These data are compared to performance data from Electrical’s 
sister company, which as already discussed had not implemented the balanced scorecard at 
that time.  The fifth and final section of the paper summarises the implications of this 
research for both the practitioner and academic audiences. 
2. The Impact of Performance Measures                                  
– Relevant Literature 
The shortcomings and dysfunctional consequences of performance measurement systems 
have been discussed in the academic literature for at least fifty years (Ridgway, 1956), but 
recently there has been a flurry of activity (Chenhall, 2005; Norreklit, 2000; Norreklit, 
2003).  Throughout the 1980s vocal and influential authors criticised the measurement 
systems used by many firms (Johnson and Kaplan, 1988; Hayes and Abernathy, 1980).  By 
the 1990s the noise made by these voices had grown to a crescendo (Melnyk et al., 2004; 
Neely et al., 1995; Neely, 1999) and increasing numbers of firms appeared to be "re-
engineering" their measurement systems, with data suggesting that between 1995 and 
2000, 30 to 60% of companies transformed their performance measurement systems (Frigo 
and Krumwiede, 1999; Frigo, 2000).  Evidence suggests, for example, that by 2001 the 
balanced scorecard had been adopted by 44% of organisations worldwide (57% in the UK, 
46% in the US and 26% in Germany and Austria).  And more recent data suggests that 
85% of organisations had performance measurement system initiatives underway by the 
end of 2004 (Marr et al., 2004; Rigby, 2001; Rigby, 2005; Silk, 1998; Speckbacher et al., 
2003).  However, cautionary evidence from three Austrian academics reported that 8% of 
174 companies from German speaking countries decided not to implement a performance 
measurement system (and a balanced scorecard in particular) because they could not see 
advantages or ‘positive impact’, especially given the implementation effort required 
(Speckbacher et al., 2003). 
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Somewhat surprisingly (especially given all of this activity) there has been relatively little 
empirical research into whether the balanced scorecard actually works.  In fact this 
criticism can be levelled at the field of performance measurement more generally, which 
has seen much prescription, but relatively little empirical research (Franco-Santos et al. 
2007).  Kaplan and Norton have made some efforts to demonstrate the impact of the 
balanced scorecard, but their approach has been to use largely anecdotal cases (Kaplan and 
Norton, 2001).  An important and notable exception is the work of Chris Ittner and David 
Larcker, who report that only 23% of organizations that they surveyed consistently built 
and tested causal models to underpin their measurement systems, but that these 23% 
achieved 2.95% higher return on assets and 5.14% higher return on equity (Ittner and 
Larcker, 2003). 
Similar studies, executed less robustly, have been undertaken by consultancy and 
commercial research firms.  These studies tend to suggest that organisations managed 
through ‘balanced’ performance measurement systems perform better than those that are 
not (Gates, 1999; Lingle and Schiemann, 1996).  Lingle and Schiemann (1996) report 
evidence that organisations making more extensive use of financial and non-financial 
measures and linking strategic measures to operational measures have higher stock market 
returns (Lingle and Schiemann, 1996).  While Lawson et al’s (2003) study shows that the 
use of a performance measurement system as a management control tool reduces overhead 
costs by 25% and increases sales and profits (Lawson et al.  2003).  Other authors, such as 
de Waal (2003) and Sandt et al (2001), report less tangible benefits from the use of 
performance measurement systems (de Waal, 2003; Sandt et al.  2001).  Dumond (1994) 
and Sandt et al (2001) suggest that using balanced performance measurement systems 
improves the decision-making performance of managers and employees (de Waal, 2003; 
Dumond, 1994).  Lawson et al (2003) and Dumond (1994) found that using performance 
measurement systems and linking scorecards to compensation significantly increased 
employee satisfaction, although Ittner et al. (2003b) present evidence to the contrary 
(Dumond, 1994; Ittner et al., 2003b; Lawson et al., 2003). 
Ketelhohn (1999) and Vasconcellos (1988) found that the identification and selection of 
appropriate measures and key performance indictors enhance the implementation and 
acceptance of business strategy, at the same time as enhancing employee understanding of 
the business (Ketelhohn, 1998; Vasconcellos, 1988).  Furthermore, Forza and Salvador’s 
research (2000, 2001) supports the suggestion that employee communication that focuses 
on feedback from measures increases collaboration and facilitates buy-in (Forza and 
Salvador, 2000; Forza and Salvador, 2001). 
In recent years there have been some attempts to evaluate the impact of the balanced 
scorecard more robustly.  Perhaps the best examples are the studies reported by (Davis and 
Albright, 2004; Ittner et al., 2003a; Malina and Selto, 2001).  The study by Ittner et al 
(2003a) explored the performance of impact of the balanced scorecard and the associated 
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incentive scheme in a global financial services firm (Ittner et al., 2003a).  This study is 
rather critical of the balanced scorecard, arguing that the inherent subjectivity in the 
incentive scheme associated with the balanced scorecard undermined the credibility of the 
balanced scorecard in the organisation.  Malina and Selto (2001) studied the operation of 
the balanced scorecard in multiple divisions of a large international manufacturing firm.  
They conclude that the balanced scorecard, as designed and implemented, proved an 
effective device for controlling corporate strategy, but they provide limited empirical 
evidence to support this assertion (Malina and Selto, 2001). 
The final study – the one reported by Davis and Albright (2004) – most closely resembles 
the study reported in this paper.  The Davis and Albright (2004) study uses a control group 
to evaluate the performance impact of the balanced scorecard.  Davis and Albright (2004) 
select nine matched pairs of branches in the banking sector and compare their performance.  
This study finds evidence of superior financial performance in those branches that adopt 
the balanced scorecard (Davis and Albright, 2004).  In essence, the research reported in 
this paper adopts a similar methodology to the Davis and Albright study, but bases the 
study on a far larger data set – 56 matched pairs of branches instead of 9 - and three years 
worth of financial data rather than two. 
3.  Research Methodology and Questions 
As stated already, the aim of the research reported in this paper was to address the question 
- what is the performance impact of the balanced scorecard?  To address this question the 
authors decided to adopt the quasi-experimental design methodology advocated by (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979).  Core to the experimental design was the authors’ involvement (over 
an extended period) in the design and deployment of a balanced scorecard in a multi-
branch electrical wholesale business based in the UK.  The author worked with the board 
of the business and other members of the firm's senior management team over a two-year 
period, facilitating the design and deployment of their balanced scorecard.  The length and 
extent of this involvement delivered significant benefits to the research in several ways.  
Firstly, the author's involvement in the entire design and deployment process gave him 
detailed insight and valuable contextual information, which was used in the subsequent 
data analysis.  Second, the author was able to obtain unparalleled access to the organisation 
and particularly highly sensitive and confidential performance data. 
In essence the author was able to access sales and profitability data from two sister 
organizations.  The first, Electrical, was the one which implemented the balanced 
scorecard in January 2001, following a one year design and deployment process.  Electrical 
provided data for 122 branches.  The second company, Sister, continued to use traditional 
methods of performance reporting throughout the period of the study and provided data 
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from 190 branches.  These two sets of data were compared and branches based in the same 
location were matched.  This matching by location enabled the research to compare 
changes in organizational performance over the duration of the study, while controlling for 
local economic conditions, product range and customer base. 
Before the financial data are presented, the balanced scorecard design and deployment 
process adopted by the firm will be explained.  The description of the design and 
deployment processes is central to the rest of the paper as it illustrates the effort that the 
firm put into designing and deploying their balanced scorecard, thereby negating one 
potential criticism of this paper – namely that the balanced scorecard being evaluated is 
simply a poorly designed one. 
4. The Design and Deployment of Electrical’s Balanced 
Scorecard  
Electrical’s history is an interesting one.  Established late in the 19
th
 century, the business 
had an annual turnover of over £200 million and held 8.5% of the UK’s market share in 
2002.  A decade earlier the situation had been rather different.  Electrical was a traditional 
family business until the early 1990s.  The organisation was tightly controlled and highly 
centralised.  Power rested with two members of the family and their inner circle.  
Generally the external perception of the business was that it was old-fashioned and offered 
no particular threat to its competitors. 
In 1993 a new Managing Director was appointed.  As well as bringing new ideas, he 
engaged in a significant change programme.  New IT systems were introduced, a new 
national distribution centre was constructed and processes were streamlined.  The branch 
managers, who previously had been tightly managed from the centre, were encouraged to 
be more entrepreneurial, acting as if they were “running their own businesses”.  The 
impact of these changes was dramatic.  Over a five year period Electrical experienced 
significant growth.  Revenues increased from £50 million to £200 million, market share 
from 2% to 8.5% and the business delivered 5 consecutive years of 30% profit growth. 
The Need for Change 
While this new entrepreneurial culture resulted in business success, it also encouraged 
some destructive behaviour.  A key part of the culture change that the new Managing 
Director introduced was to encourage branch managers to behave as if they were running 
their own businesses.  The branch managers were incentivised to be entrepreneurial, 
constantly seeking out new business opportunities [to reinforce this branch manager bonus 
payments were based on branch profitability.  One consequence of this was that different 
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branches would compete with one another for the same order.  Under the accounting 
system employed by the business the branch that delivered the order was credited with the 
sale, so it was in every branch managers’ financial interest [because of the bonus scheme] 
to ensure that their branch won every order they could.  Not surprisingly this resulted in 
situations where one of Electrical’s branches would undercut another of Electrical’s 
branches to win an order.  Effectively the branches traded away margin to beat their sister 
branches in bidding wars. 
In addition to competing for orders the competition between branches meant that there was 
very limited sharing of information between branches.  Electrical’s customers exhibit some 
interesting behaviours which make the lack of information sharing unusually problematic.  
The work for electricians is geographically dispersed, with much of the UK building work 
taking place in the South of the country.  Yet electricians are remarkably loyal to their 
home branch.  Indeed it is clear from the interactions that take place in the branches that 
many of the branch staff count their customers among their friends.  When an electrician is 
working away from home – for example, an electrician based in Newcastle is working in 
London – the electrician will tend to phone their home branch to request product.  The 
electrician working in London will phone the Newcastle branch to ask for 200 light  bulbs.  
Rather than the Newcastle branch saying to the electrician, “we have a branch in London 
that can deliver those to you”, he would arrange a special delivery [from Newcastle to 
London – cities which are 300 miles apart].  The reason is simple, if the Newcastle branch 
delivers the light bulbs then the Newcastle branch is credited with the sale and hence their 
profit figures look better, particularly if they can deliver other products to customers in 
Middlesborough, Darlington, York, Durham, Peterborough and Cambridge on the way to 
London.  The problem, of course, is that all of these cities have existing Electrical branches 
capable of delivering the product more quickly and more cheaply [the net transport costs 
would be lower], but the measurement and incentive schemes in the business were 
structured in a way that discouraged the more efficient behaviour of passing orders from 
one branch to another. 
As the business grew the impact of these behaviours became more pronounced and more 
noticeable and so in 2000 the board of Electrical began considering how they might change 
the measurement and incentive schemes used in the business.  After due consideration and 
consultation the board made the decision to adopt a balanced scorecard and explicitly seek 
to design a measurement and associated incentive scheme that would encourage a further 
change in behaviour.  Based on a slide that the business subsequently used in the balanced 
scorecard communication programme, figure 1 summarises the behavioural and attitudinal 
changes that the business was seeking to encourage. 
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Figure 1: Electrical’s Journey – Slide Used in the Cascade and Communication Programme 
 
 
The Journey 
Branches are profit centres 
 
Branches are service centres 
 
Branches are a network Branches are autonomous 
 
Global optimisation Local optimisation 
 
Branches share knowledge Branches hold knowledge 
 
Amazon.com = competition 
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Differentiate by relationships Price war – compete on price 
 
Today… Tomorrow… 
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Designing the Balanced Scorecard 
The design and deployment of Electrical’s balanced scorecard consisted of the three 
phases, as suggested in the literature (Bourne et al.  2000).  The first phase, which ran from 
January to May 2000 involved identifying what and how to measure, along with 
construction of the bonus scheme.  The second phase, which ran from June to December 
2000, involved deploying the balanced scorecard – cascading the scheme across the 
business and creating the necessary supporting infrastructure.  The balanced scorecard was 
formally launched on 1
st
 January 2001 and the third phase – ongoing support – followed 
this. 
During the design phase the top management team – in this case the executive board – 
were intimately involved in identifying what and how to measure.  They followed well 
established processes for designing balanced scorecards prescribed in the literature 
(Bourne et al, 2002; Kaplan and Norton, 2000; Neely et al, 2002b).  They began by 
creating a success map for the business which articulated their theory about how the 
business worked and only when they had considered this did the board turn to the question 
of what to measure.  They spent considerable time debating and refining the actual 
performance measures, again using materials well described in the academic literature 
(Neely et al., 1997).  Throughout this process the board consulted widely with other key 
stakeholders in the business.  Workshops were held with influential groups of managers, 
including the regional managers, who were seen as central to the successful 
implementation of the scheme. 
As well as working on the identification and definition of measures, the board also spent 
time in the design phase considering how the firms’ incentive schemes should be 
redesigned when the balanced scorecard was implemented.  Having completed these 
activities the balanced scorecard project moved into its second phase – deployment. 
Scorecard Deployment 
A key element of the deployment phase was the creation of so-called “balanced scorecard 
champions”.  As mentioned previously, the regional managers were seen as key influencers 
in the successful design and deployment of the balanced scorecard.  Each regional manager 
had full financial and operational responsibility for one of eight regions in the UK.  
Typically they had 15-20 branch managers reporting to them.  The regional managers were 
given a series of three two–day executive education courses on the balanced scorecard.  
The first of these courses was introductory and involved an explanation of the balanced 
scorecard – what it was and how it worked – as well as a review of Electrical’s balanced 
scorecard.  Throughout this course the regional managers were encouraged to comment on 
Electrical’s scorecard, highlighting any concerns they had about it.  The second course was 
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more in-depth and involved an exploration of the four perspectives on Electrical’s balanced 
scorecard – financial, customer, operational and people [which replaced the innovation and 
learning perspective].  During this course the regional managers were exposed to the latest 
thinking in these four areas.  The final two-day course involved consideration of the 
change process.  As well as sessions on change management, the regional managers 
participated in substantive debates about how the balanced scorecard should be cascaded 
through the business. 
To support the cascade process a series of eight one-day regional workshops were held for 
the branch managers.  Each regional manager invited all of their direct reports to a regional 
workshop.  These workshops, which were delivered by a professional educator, were 
designed to introduce the balanced scorecard to the branch managers.  The managing 
director of the business came for the last hour of each of these regional workshops to 
answer any questions the branch managers wanted to raise. 
Having completed their workshops the regional and branch managers delivered standard 
cascade presentations to the branch staff.  The cascade presentation was designed by the 
regional management team, with the support of a professional educator and delivered by 
the regional managers to everyone in the business during a series of evening workshops.  It 
is important to note that this business was not one that had invested heavily in training and 
education previously.  In informal discussions with the author many people in the business 
commented that the level of investment made in the balanced scorecard project illustrated 
how seriously the business was taking it.  Indeed the Managing Director described the 
balanced scorecard project as “the most significant change we have undertaken for a 
decade”.  
In parallel to training and education the development team continued to work with the 
finance and IT functions to create “dummy” scorecard reports and ensure that the 
necessary data for reporting purposes were available.  Between August and December the 
business began releasing “dummy” scorecard reports to the branches.  The “dummy” 
reports were sent with the monthly profit and loss reports that the branches had 
traditionally received, but were accompanied with a note explaining that from the 1
st
 
January the “dummy” reports were the only reports that branches would receive – i.e. the 
business would no longer release to branch managers their own profit and loss accounts. 
This change – the decision not to release monthly profit and loss accounts - was extremely 
controversial when it was first announced.  Indeed at the regional workshops there was 
typically a stunned silence when the branch managers were told that from 1
st
 January 2001 
they would no longer be receiving their branch’s profit and loss account.  Only when the 
branch managers understood all of the measures on the balanced scorecard [which included 
many of the elements that made up the profit and loss account] were the signs of disbelief 
suspended. 
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Changing the Incentive Scheme 
The balanced scorecard was formally launched in the business on 1
st
 January 2001.  From 
that day the firm’s bonus scheme was coupled to the balanced scorecard for all branch 
managers and staff.  The firm adopted a bonus scheme where the bonus paid to individual 
branches was based on two factors – the branch’s performance and the company’s overall 
performance1.  Branches earned points based on their performance against the performance 
measures on the balanced scorecard.  For every measure red, amber and green target zones 
were set.  When branches performed in the green zone they earned 3 points, the amber 
zone 1.5 points and the red zone 0 points.  The scorecard reports released to the branch 
managers each month included the running total number of points that the branch had 
earned that year. 
The value of the points was based on the firm’s overall profitability.  The board set aside a 
bonus fund that grew in relation to the firm’s overall profitability.  Below a minimum 
threshold the firm’s profit was unacceptable and so no bonus was paid.  When the 
threshold was reached the firm’s guaranteed to pay a minimum of £3 million, for example, 
in bonus payments.  There was no ceiling on the bonus fund.  The more profit the firm 
generated the greater the amount of money paid into the bonus fund. 
To calculate the value of each point, the firm calculated the total number of points earned 
by all branches and divided the total bonus fund [based on the firm’s profitability] by the 
total number of points earned.  The advantage of this scheme is that it encouraged branch 
managers and staff to think about overall company profitability, as well as the performance 
of their branch. 
Additional Support and Encouragement 
To further reinforce the message about the importance of the balanced scorecard the 
business put in place a number of other initiatives.  First, a scorecard steering committee, 
chaired by the HR Director was established.  The scorecard steering committee oversaw 
the implementation of the balanced scorecard, monitoring how well the scheme was 
working and identifying what additional support was required.  As well as gathering 
informal feedback the steering committee established a set of formal scorecard reviews, 
calling together all of the regional managers once a month to gather their opinions on the 
balanced scorecard and how well it was working. 
One of the common requests from the branches was for improved drill down information – 
information that would allow the branch managers to identify the root causes of problems 
                                                 
1
  The bonus was paid to the branch and then allocated to individual members of staff by the branch manager, 
in discussion with the regional manager. 
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identified by the measures on the balanced scorecard.  The steering committee 
commissioned work from the IT department to address this issue, as well as establishing a 
small group who could resolve questions and queries about the data contained in the 
scorecard reports. 
Given the structure of the business – largely homogeneous branches – the consistent 
performance measures applied to the branches offered significant opportunities for 
benchmarking and the identification and sharing of good practices.  The regional managers 
used the balanced scorecards to compare the relative performance of branches within their 
regions as well as comparing the performance of branches across regions.  Where 
significant differences in performance were identified the regional managers set out to 
explore why these differences existed and to identify whether there were any specific 
practices they could transfer from one branch to another.  One of the measures on the 
balanced scorecard – the internal performance audit – further encouraged this activity.  In 
essence the internal performance audit was an audit of branch practices.  Regional 
managers were expected to audit the performance of the branches in their region, assessing 
their performance against a number of standards – e.g. external appearance, trade counter, 
warehouse, systems and procedures, staff, customers and back office.  Undertaking this 
audit forced regional managers to look in detail at the practices adopted by specific 
branches, thereby enabling them to identify examples of good practices that they could 
communicate to others. 
Clearly the theme of communication ran heavily throughout the implementation of the 
balanced scorecard in Electrical.  As well as all of the education and awareness raising 
activities, the business established a formal communication programme to emphasise the 
importance of the scheme.  They adopted the cartoon character Popeye as a symbol.  All 
communication about the balanced scorecard was accompanied by a cartoon showing 
Popeye eating spinach, the food which gives him strength, and the caption “are you getting 
your greens” – a reference to the green zone for the performance targets. 
Overall the time and effort expended by Electrical on designing, deploying and supporting 
the balanced scorecard was significant.  Contrasting the approach they adopted with that 
prescribed in the literature, it is difficult to see what more they could have done.  So let us 
now turn to the question of what was the performance impact? 
5. Evaluating the Impact of the Balanced Scorecard  
To explore the impact of the balanced scorecard on Electrical two phases of analysis were 
undertaken.  These are presented in the next two sections of the paper.  In the first the 
performance of all of Electrical’s branches will be considered, for the time period 2000-
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2002.  Electrical made branch level data available on monthly sales and gross profit for the 
period 2000-2002.  The business formally introduced the balanced scorecard on 1st 
January 2001, from which time they stopped releasing profit and loss accounts to the 
branches and linked the bonus scheme to the balanced scorecard.  Following an internal 
reorganization, Electrical reversed this decision from 1st January 2002, reintroducing profit 
and loss reporting at the branch level. 
To supplement the financial data this research draws on two other qualitative data sources.  
These data, which were gathered via participant observation during the design and 
deployment phase of the balanced scorecard project and through a series of semi-structured 
interviews conducted six to nine months after the balanced scorecard had been 
implemented, will be used to explore some of the findings from the quantitative data. 
The firm also made available data on the sales and gross profit performance of the Sister 
company’s branches.  These data are used in a quasi-experimental design.  Electrical 
branches are matched with the geographically nearest Sister branch.  The matching process 
results in 56 matched pairs of branches.  Matching branches based on geographical 
location controls for local economic and labour market activity.  Given Electrical and 
Sister both operate in the same industry [indeed they had been direct competitors prior to 
the take-over of Electrical by Sister] the matching process also controls for industry 
effects.  Unfortunately, for reasons of commercial sensitivity, Sister was only willing to 
make monthly branch level sales and gross profit data available to the research team for 
2000 and 2001 [not 2002].  However this still enabled the research team to explore the 
relative changes in performance between Electrical and Sister during the period when the 
balanced scorecard was introduced. 
The Impact of the Balanced Scorecard in Electrical 
As mentioned in the previous section, Electrical provided monthly branch level figures for 
sales and gross profit for 122 branches for the calendar years 2000-2002.  32 branches 
opened or closed during the period of study and some data were unavailable for a further 3 
of them, leaving an effective sample of 87 branches.  Between them, these 87 branches 
achieved sales of just over £160 million/year during the period of the study.  Figure 2 
shows how Electrical’s sales and gross profit changed over the period under study.  As can 
be seen from the data there is some seasonality in the business, with sales and gross profit 
dipping in December. 
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Figure 2: Electrical’s Normalised Monthly Financial Performance 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Ja
n-
00
M
ar
-0
0
M
ay
-0
0
Ju
l-0
0
S
ep
-0
0
N
ov
-0
0
Ja
n-
01
M
ar
-0
1
M
ay
-0
1
Ju
l-0
1
S
ep
-0
1
N
ov
-0
1
Ja
n-
02
M
ar
-0
2
M
ay
-0
2
Ju
l-0
2
S
ep
-0
2
N
ov
-0
2
N
o
rm
a
li
s
e
d
 S
a
le
s
 a
n
d
 G
ro
s
s
 P
ro
fi
t
Normalised sales Normalised gross profit
 
Table 1 summarises these data and compares sales and gross profit in 2000 with 2001 and 
2002.  These data suggest that while sales were higher in 2001 (during the period when the 
balanced scorecard was operating), sales dropped back in 2002 (once the company had 
reverted to traditional profit and loss reporting). 
Table 1: Summary Performance Data for Electrical 
 2000 2001 2002 
Total Sales 100% 103.34% 91.83% 
Gross Profit 100% 97.75% 92.28% 
 
To explore these findings in more detail the research team conducted paired sample t-tests 
comparing the sample means.  As mentioned previously, the data in Figure 2 suggest some 
seasonality, certainly in terms of sales, so the decision was taken to compare sales in 
January 2000 with sales in January 2001 and to compare separately sales in February 2000 
with sales in February 2001, etc.  The process resulted in 48 paired samples being tested, 
24 for each of sales and gross profit.  Table 2 shows the results of the 48 tests. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Monthly Sales and Gross Profit
2
 
Variable Dates Obs Mean Difference Std Err Std Dev t Pr(T>t) 
Sales 01/2000-01/2001 87 -24.08 3.77 35.13 -6.39 1.00
***
 
 02/2000-02/2001 87 -4.58 3.18 29.66 -1.44 0.92
*
 
 03/2000-03/2001 87 -5.58 4.44 41.37 -1.26 0.89 
 04/2000-04/2001 87 -19.39 4.43 41.31 -4.38 1.00
***
 
 05/2000-05/2001 87 -6.67 4.25 39.67 -1.57 0.94
*
 
 06/2000-06/2001 87 -4.87 4.00 37.27 -1.22 0.89 
 07/2000-07/2001 87 -16.77 4.47 41.67 -3.75 1.00
***
 
 08/2000-08/2001 87 -7.09 4.90 45.68 -1.45 0.92
*
 
 09/2000-09/2001 87 0.76 3.98 37.13 0.19 0.42 
 10/2000-10/2001 87 -5.51 4.21 39.26 -1.31 0.90
*
 
 11/2000-11/2001 87 -7.95 3.25 30.36 -2.44 0.99
***
 
 12/2000-12/2001 87 4.11 2.18 20.30 1.89 0.03
++
 
 01/2001-01/2002 87 4.37 3.02 28.12 1.45 0.08
*
 
 02/2001-02/2002 87 4.31 3.09 28.78 1.40 0.08
*
 
 03/2001-03/2002 87 15.07 3.65 34.05 4.13 0.00
***
 
 04/2001-04/2002 87 0.91 3.76 35.11 0.24 0.40 
 05/2001-05/2002 87 -0.36 3.48 32.49 -0.10 0.54 
 06/2001-06/2002 87 26.54 3.28 30.59 8.09 0.00
***
 
 07/2001-07/2002 87 9.30 4.91 45.77 1.89 0.03
**
 
 08/2001-08/2002 87 23.78 6.26 58.35 3.80 0.00
***
 
 09/2001-09/2002 87 10.52 5.18 48.29 2.03 0.02
**
 
 10/2001-10/2002 87 14.19 6.90 64.40 2.05 0.02
**
 
 11/2001-11/2002 87 20.81 6.06 56.52 3.43 0.00
***
 
 12/2001-12/2002 87 5.87 4.11 38.30 1.43 0.08
*
 
Gross Profit 01/2000-01/2001 87 -24.56 4.11 38.33 -5.98 1.00
***
 
 02/2000-02/2001 87 -7.89 3.16 29.47 -2.50 0.99
***
 
 03/2000-03/2001 87 -7.95 3.99 37.24 -1.99 0.98
**
 
 04/2000-04/2001 87 27.17 7.56 70.52 3.59 0.00
+++
 
 05/2000-05/2001 87 -8.15 4.14 38.58 -1.97 0.97
**
 
 06/2000-06/2001 87 -5.57 3.78 35.27 -1.47 0.93
*
 
 07/2000-07/2001 87 -10.45 4.22 39.39 -2.47 0.99
***
 
 08/2000-08/2001 87 -0.16 4.06 37.85 -0.04 0.52 
 09/2000-09/2001 87 2.81 3.77 35.14 0.75 0.23 
 10/2000-10/2001 87 -6.26 3.90 36.38 -1.61 0.94
*
 
                                                 
2
 *** = significant at 1% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; ** = significant at 5% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; * = significant at 10% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+++
 = significant at 1% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
++
 = significant at 5% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+
 = significant at 10% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact. 
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Variable Dates Obs Mean Difference Std Err Std Dev t Pr(T>t) 
 11/2000-11/2001 87 -0.25 3.38 31.54 -0.08 0.53 
 12/2000-12/2001 87 4.22 2.84 26.45 1.49 0.07
+
 
 01/2001-01/2002 87 11.70 3.04 28.36 3.85 0.00
***
 
 02/2001-02/2002 87 15.72 2.57 23.94 6.12 0.00
***
 
 03/2001-03/2002 87 19.76 3.16 29.52 6.24 0.00
***
 
 04/2001-04/2002 87 -11.28 2.95 27.51 -3.82 1.00
+++
 
 05/2001-05/2002 87 2.34 2.85 26.55 0.82 0.21 
 06/2001-06/2002 87 26.23 3.23 30.12 8.12 0.00
***
 
 07/2001-07/2002 87 -41.33 6.43 59.96 -6.43 1.00
+++
 
 08/2001-08/2002 87 15.81 7.07 65.97 2.24 0.01
***
 
 09/2001-09/2002 87 3.54 5.65 52.67 0.63 0.27 
 10/2001-10/2002 87 9.84 6.29 58.70 1.56 0.06* 
 11/2001-11/2002 87 14.81 5.48 51.11 2.70 0.00
***
 
 12/2001-12/2002 87 2.25 3.67 34.27 0.61 0.27 
 
Of the 48 tests, 37 provided a statistically significant result (see Table 2).  31 of these were 
consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard made a positive difference, 
while six were inconsistent with this assertion.  Nineteen of the statistically significant 
results related to sales, eighteen of which supported the hypothesis that the balanced 
scorecard made a positive difference.  Of these nineteen statistically significant results, 
nine supported the hypothesis that there was a statistically significant increase in sales after 
the introduction of the balanced scorecard, while eight supported the hypothesis that there 
was a statistically significant reduction in sales after the removal of the balanced scorecard.  
In terms of changes in gross profit there were eighteen statistically significant results, 
fourteen of which supported the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard made a positive 
difference.  Seven results showed that there was a statistically significant increase in gross 
profit after the balanced scorecard was introduced, while a further seven showed that there 
was a statistically significant decrease in gross profit after the removal of the balanced 
scorecard. 
On the surface, these data appear to suggest that introduction of the balanced scorecard has 
had a positive impact in terms of both sales and gross profit and its removal has had a 
negative impact on both of these variables.  Clearly there are questions of what else was 
happening in the business at the same time, especially given the fact that Electrical was 
taken over during the third quarter of 2000, during the deployment of the balanced 
scorecard.  It could therefore be argued that many members of the organization would have 
been distracted and concerned about the implications of the takeover and therefore it would 
not be surprising to see performance deteriorate during the last quarter of 2000 and the 
early part of 2001.  Indeed it was clear to the author of this paper who was working with 
the company at the time that many people were distracted, but it is important to understand 
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the magnitude of the change that the organization felt it was undertaking by implementing 
the balanced scorecard.  The Chief Executive frequently described the implementation of 
the balanced scorecard as the biggest change that the business had made in a decade and it 
had clearly captured the attention of many of the business’ most senior managers.  Indeed, 
in the 3rd quarter of 2000 the board of Electrical declared that they were willing 
collectively to resign if their new parent company blocked the implementation of the 
balanced scorecard
3
. The point is that while other events were clearly occurring in the 
organization at the time of the study one of the most significant was widely perceived to be 
the implementation of the balanced scorecard and associated incentive scheme. 
Contrasting Electrical with Sister 
As already discussed, in addition to the sales and gross profit data made available by 
Electrical the company that acquired Electrical owned another wholesaler of Electrical 
components in the UK – called Sister for the purposes of this paper.  Sister provided 
monthly data on sales and gross profit for some 192 branches for 2000 and 2001.  This 
data set was combined with the data provided by Electrical and 56 matched pairs of 
branches (branches based in the same town/city) were identified.  This process allowed the 
research team to control for local economic conditions, product range and customer base, 
as Electrical and Sister branches tended to stock a similar range of products and deal with a 
similar range of customers.  The data was normalized with the values for January 2000 in 
each case being set to 100.  Figure 3 summarises the average growth in sales and gross 
profit performance for these matched sets of branches during 2000 and 2001 using these 
data. 
To explore these findings in more detail paired sample t-tests were conducted comparing 
the sample means.  Again, to take account of seasonality growth in both sales and gross 
profit was compared on a year by year basis.  Sales and gross profit growth were calculated 
for both Electrical and Sister separately and then the rates of growth compared.  Table 3 
shows the results of these analyses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
  Discussion between the board of Electrical and the Chairman and Finance Director of the company that acquired them in Sept., 
2000. 
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Figure 3: Comparing Electrical and Sister’s Performance 
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As Table 3 shows there is no statistically significant difference between the growth in sales 
and the gross in growth profits between the Electrical and Sister branches, suggesting that 
the earlier observed differences are more likely due to external factors [i.e. those affecting 
all branches] rather than internal factors [e.g. management changes such as the introduction 
of the balanced scorecard].  Given the balanced scorecard is designed to have an impact on 
branch performance this is a surprising finding, but there are of course differences in the 
rate of adoption of the balanced scorecard in different branches. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Monthly Sales and Gross Profit for Matched Branches
4
 
Variable Dates Obs Mean Difference Std Err Std Dev t Pr(T>t) 
Sales 01/2000-01/2001 56 -0.250 7.296 54.599 -0.034 0.514 
 02/2000-02/2001 56 -0.907 7.384 55.258 -0.123 0.549 
 03/2000-03/2001 56 -1.511 9.216 68.967 -0.164 0.565 
 04/2000-04/2001 56 0.600 6.015 45.013 0.100 0.460 
 05/2000-05/2001 56 -0.220 7.173 53.675 -0.031 0.512 
 06/2000-06/2001 56 -0.698 6.993 52.334 -0.100 0.540 
 07/2000-07/2001 56 -0.968 7.565 56.614 -0.128 0.551 
 08/2000-08/2001 56 -0.449 7.116 53.254 -0.063 0.525 
 09/2000-09/2001 56 -0.097 8.006 59.915 -0.012 0.505 
 10/2000-10/2001 56 0.758 7.094 53.089 0.107 0.458 
 11/2000-11/2001 56 1.045 8.623 64.532 0.121 0.452 
 12/2000-12/2001 56 0.915 5.600 41.905 0.163 0.435 
Gross Profit 01/2000-01/2001 56 0.281 7.689 57.540 0.037 0.486 
 02/2000-02/2001 56 -0.846 6.660 49.836 -0.127 0.550 
 03/2000-03/2001 56 -1.847 7.790 58.294 -0.237 0.593 
 04/2000-04/2001 56 0.357 16.875 126.282 0.021 0.492 
 05/2000-05/2001 56 -0.059 6.645 49.728 -0.009 0.504 
 06/2000-06/2001 56 -0.534 6.761 50.594 -0.079 0.531 
 07/2000-07/2001 56 -0.770 6.879 51.480 -0.112 0.544 
 08/2000-08/2001 56 -0.412 7.751 58.005 -0.053 0.521 
 09/2000-09/2001 56 0.036 8.666 64.849 0.004 0.498 
 10/2000-10/2001 56 1.472 7.618 57.010 0.193 0.424 
 11/2000-11/2001 56 1.061 8.992 67.290 0.118 0.453 
 12/2000-12/2001 56 1.200 4.919 36.812 0.244 0.404 
One of the other variables that the organisation made available to the researcher was 
number of non-financial balanced scorecard points earned.  This score was calculated by 
awarding “points” for every green [above target performance].  At June 2001 the range of 
points earned ran from a minimum of 4 points to a maximum of 67, with a mean of 24.22 
points [n=50, as data on the number of non-financial balanced scorecard points earned 
were not available for six of the matched pairs of branches].  These data suggest that some 
branches took the balanced scorecard more seriously than others – or at least managed to 
perform better against it than other branches.  So the analysis was re-run in two separate 
sets.  First the analysis was re-run only for those branches scoring more than 24.22 points 
[i.e. the branches that were performing well on the balanced scorecard].  Second the 
analysis was re-run for those branches with less than 24.22 points [i.e. the branches that 
                                                 
4
 *** = significant at 1% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; ** = significant at 5% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; * = significant at 10% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+++
 = significant at 1% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
++
 = significant at 5% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+
 = significant at 10% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact. 
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were performing badly on the balanced scorecard].  Tables 4 and 5 summarise the results 
of these analyses. 
Table 4: Comparison of Monthly Sales and Gross Profit for Matched Branches 
[Branches that Score Well on the Non-Financial Measures]
 5
 
Variable Dates Obs Mean Difference Std Err Std Dev t Pr(T>t) 
Sales 01/2000-01/2001 25 -7.220 10.262 51.308 -0.704 0.756 
 02/2000-02/2001 25 -7.240 11.247 56.236 -0.644 0.737 
 03/2000-03/2001 25 -13.319 14.833 74.165 -0.898 0.811 
 04/2000-04/2001 25 -3.731 10.059 50.293 -0.371 0.643 
 05/2000-05/2001 25 -2.926 11.220 56.100 -0.261 0.602 
 06/2000-06/2001 25 1.162 9.324 46.620 0.125 0.451 
 07/2000-07/2001 25 -0.090 9.686 48.432 -0.009 0.504 
 08/2000-08/2001 25 -10.468 11.032 55.162 -0.949 0.824 
 09/2000-09/2001 25 -9.943 12.536 62.680 -0.793 0.782 
 10/2000-10/2001 25 -8.344 11.816 59.081 -0.706 0.757 
 11/2000-11/2001 25 -13.048 16.239 81.193 -0.804 0.785 
 12/2000-12/2001 25 -11.730 10.091 50.454 -1.162 0.872 
Gross Profit 01/2000-01/2001 25 -7.942 10.460 52.300 -0.759 0.773 
 02/2000-02/2001 25 -10.643 10.286 51.429 -1.035 0.844 
 03/2000-03/2001 25 -8.117 14.100 70.502 -0.576 0.715 
 04/2000-04/2001 25 -25.935 28.831 144.155 -0.900 0.811 
 05/2000-05/2001 25 -4.035 10.614 53.071 -0.380 0.646 
 06/2000-06/2001 25 4.353 10.228 51.139 0.426 0.337 
 07/2000-07/2001 25 -2.062 11.034 55.169 -0.187 0.573 
 08/2000-08/2001 25 -15.285 11.429 57.143 -1.337 0.903
**
 
 09/2000-09/2001 25 -12.183 12.049 60.246 -1.011 0.839 
 10/2000-10/2001 25 -11.892 11.557 57.787 -1.029 0.843 
 11/2000-11/2001 25 -13.486 15.430 77.151 -0.874 0.805 
 12/2000-12/2001 25 -8.811 8.211 41.053 -1.073 0.853 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 *** = significant at 1% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; ** = significant at 5% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; * = significant at 10% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+++
 = significant at 1% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
++
 = significant at 5% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+
 = significant at 10% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Monthly Sales and Gross Profit for Matched Branches 
[Branches that Score Badly on the Non-Financial Measures]
 6
 
Variable Dates Obs Mean Difference Std Err Std Dev t Pr(T>t) 
Sales 01/2000-01/2001 25 8.034 12.582 62.911 0.639 0.265 
 02/2000-02/2001 25 2.489 11.901 59.503 0.209 0.418 
 03/2000-03/2001 25 15.805 13.484 67.419 1.172 0.126 
 04/2000-04/2001 25 5.142 8.752 43.759 0.588 0.281 
 05/2000-05/2001 25 4.448 10.478 52.391 0.425 0.338 
 06/2000-06/2001 25 5.503 11.538 57.692 0.477 0.319 
 07/2000-07/2001 25 10.669 12.476 62.382 0.855 0.201 
 08/2000-08/2001 25 17.151 10.204 51.022 1.681 0.053
+
 
 09/2000-09/2001 25 13.059 12.465 62.324 1.048 0.153 
 10/2000-10/2001 25 11.378 9.933 49.667 1.145 0.132 
 11/2000-11/2001 25 21.221 8.887 44.434 2.388 0.013
++
 
 12/2000-12/2001 25 15.002 5.757 28.783 2.606 0.008
+++
 
Gross Profit 01/2000-01/2001 25 9.670 13.036 65.181 0.742 0.233 
 02/2000-02/2001 25 3.424 9.461 47.303 0.362 0.360 
 03/2000-03/2001 25 8.393 8.993 44.967 0.933 0.180 
 04/2000-04/2001 25 18.141 22.052 110.259 0.823 0.209 
 05/2000-05/2001 25 5.267 9.329 46.644 0.565 0.289 
 06/2000-06/2001 25 -0.752 10.076 50.380 -0.075 0.529 
 07/2000-07/2001 25 10.669 12.476 62.382 0.855 0.201 
 08/2000-08/2001 25 19.416 11.930 59.652 1.628 0.058
+
 
 09/2000-09/2001 25 12.054 14.689 73.445 0.821 0.210 
 10/2000-10/2001 25 16.542 11.516 57.578 1.437 0.082
+
 
 11/2000-11/2001 25 21.399 11.571 57.857 1.849 0.038
++
 
 12/2000-12/2001 25 15.002 5.757 28.783 2.606 0.008
+++
 
Of the 24 tests presented in Tables 4 and 5, eight results are statistically significant.  One 
suggests that the balanced scorecard has a positive impact on gross profit for those 
branches that perform well in terms of the non-financial measures (see Table 4).  The other 
seven results suggest that the balanced scorecard has a negative impact on sales (three 
results) and gross profit (four results), when branches perform badly on the non-financial 
measures.  That is when branches perform badly on the non-financial measures they also 
see lower sales and gross profits than their matched comparator branches.  Two possible 
explanations for this immediately spring to mind.  It may be that branches that perform 
badly on the non-financial measures are simply badly run branches – i.e. they don’t 
                                                 
6
 *** = significant at 1% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; ** = significant at 5% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; * = significant at 10% and consistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+++
 = significant at 1% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
++
 = significant at 5% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact; 
+
 = significant at 10% and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the balanced scorecard has a positive 
impact. 
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perform well on anything, hence it is no surprise that they perform badly on sales and gross 
profits as well as the non-financial measures.  Alternatively, it may be that the staff and 
managers in these branches have spread their attention too thinly – i.e. by trying to manage 
multiple dimensions of performance simultaneously (as Michael Jensen would argue) they 
have lost their focus on the dimensions of performance that matter. 
6. Discussion and Implications 
What can be concluded overall from the data?  The first point to note is that while, at first 
sight, the data appear to suggest that the implementation of the balanced scorecard had a 
positive impact on Electrical’s performance [in terms of sales and gross profit], further 
investigation reveals that this is not the case.  Indeed the introduction of the control group 
through the quasi-experiment raises some significant questions about the performance 
impact of the balanced scorecard.  At the aggregate level, it appears that the introduction of 
the balanced scorecard has had no significant impact on branch performance in terms of 
either sales or gross profit.  And when the sample is split based success on non-financial 
measures, a case could be made that the balanced scorecard has actually had a detrimental 
effect (see Table 5) as those that branches that score well on non-financial measures 
generally do not outperform their comparator branches on the financial measures, while 
those branches that score poorly on the non-financial measures also score poorly on the 
financial measures.  Perhaps the agency theorists are correct when they argue that multi-
dimensional measurement systems are simply confusing and lead to a dispersion of effort. 
How else might these findings be explained – beyond the simple assertion that the 
balanced scorecard does not work.  The first possibility is a question of timescale.  The 
data reported in this study cover a three-year period, but the balanced scorecard was only 
in operation for a twelve month period in one division.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
behaviours in the organisation changed following the introduction of the balanced 
scorecard.  For example, several of the Directors of the firm recounted caselets illustrating 
how behaviours had changed during a series of interviews with one of the author’s 
colleagues.  The Human Resources director, for example, reported that one of the most 
fiercely competitive regional managers had started passing orders to colleagues in other 
regions after the introduction of the balanced scorecard.  While these behavioural changes 
may be desirable we know that changes in non-financial dimensions of performance do not 
immediately impact financial performance, but instead take time to flow through the 
system (Ferdows and De Meyer, 1990).  Perhaps the balanced scorecard was simply not 
left in place long enough to enable these changes to flow through and impact financial 
performance. 
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An alternative explanation, and one that certainly merits further investigation, is the 
question of what action managers could take based on the data.  The performance 
measurement system, per se, will have little impact on the organisation’s performance, 
unless people take action and change things on the basis of the reported performance data.  
Electrical spent a significant amount of time designing and deploying their balanced 
scorecard, but paid relatively limited attention to the accompanying improvement process.  
How could managers use the measurement data they were presented with to improve 
organisational performance?  Many of the measures were presented in a rather aggregated 
form.  One of the measures, for example, customer retention, reported the % of retained 
customers, but how could managers act on this?  All the managers received was a bland 
figure stating that they had retained 74% of their customers.  To act the branch managers 
needed to know, by name, which customers they had retained and which they had lost.  
They needed the contact details of the customers involved so they could make contact with 
them and try to persuade them to come back to the business.  Without this disaggregated 
information the bland figure is somewhat worthless. 
So what does this research mean for practitioners and researchers?  First the study 
highlights the fact that further research is required into the performance impact of balanced 
scorecards and the timescale over which this performance impact can be observed.  
Certainly the data presented in this study suggest that the balanced scorecard implemented 
in Electrical had no significant impact in terms of sales growth or gross profit growth over 
a twelve month period.  It may be that the balanced scorecard would have had a 
performance impact had it been retained for a longer period and the author is currently in 
negotiation with another organization to access data that will allow them to test this claim.  
Similarly, if the findings of this study are replicated in other similar naturally occurring 
experiments, then work is required to understand why balanced scorecards do not have the 
impact one would expect.  Intuitively people accept that organizations need to keep track 
of their performance so that they can identify how well they are doing and what they need 
to improve.  Well-designed balanced scorecards provide access to such measures and so if 
correctly implemented one would assume that they should enable performance 
improvement.  Yet in the case of Electrical performance improvement does not appear to 
have materialised.  Why is this the case?  Is it due to the fact that the organization did not 
give the balanced scorecard long enough to work?  Is it that the organization did not 
supplement the balanced scorecard with an appropriate improvement methodology and/or 
programme?  Is it that the balanced scorecard suffers from the same criticisms that can be 
made of many measurement systems – too much data arriving too late for managers to act 
on them?  These issues need to be explored and understood much more fully so that we can 
advise practitioners not simply on how better to measure, but on how better to perform. 
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